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DEMOCRACY IN A ONE-PARTY STATE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM LANDRUM-GRIFFIN*
CLYDE W.

SUMMERS**

THE PROBLEM OF OLIGARCHY

Over seventy years ago, the German sociologist, Robert Michels,
described what he termed "The Iron Law of Oligarchy."' He pointed
out that even organizations, such as the Social Democrat Party and the
Socialist trade unions, that were committed to democratic beliefs and
actively working to extend democratic rights were themselves governed
by "a closed caste" 2 of leaders or a "cartel" 3 and not by their members.
Oligarchic control he declared, was an inevitable product of
organization.
It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the
elected over the electors, the mandataries over the mandators,
of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization,
says oligarchy.'
Michels' conclusions concerning the possibility of achieving democracy
within such organizations were bleakly pessimistic.
The notion of the representation of popular interests, a notion
to which the great majority of democrats . . . cleave with so

much tenacity and confidence, is an illusion engendered by a
false illumination, is an effect of mirage ....
The formation of oligarchies within the various forms of
democracy is the outcome of organic necessity, and consequently affects every organization, be it socialist or anarchist. 5
Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy became almost a truism among
political scientists and sociologists who paraded cumulative examples of
formally democratic organization which came under control of leader
cartels. In the 1950's, three sociologists, Lipset, Trow and Coleman, set
* This Article was delivered as a lecture at the Industrial Relations and Labor Studies
Center of the University of Maryland at College Park.
** Fordham Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. B.S., J.D., Univ. of Illinois; J.S.D., Columbia Univ.; LL.D., Univ. of Louvain; LL.D., Univ. of Stockholm.
1. R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES; A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (1949) (originally published in Germany in 1911).
2. Id. at 156.
3. Id. at 104.
4. Id. at 401.
5. Id. at 401-02.
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about to study the deviant case of the International Typographical
Union (I.T.U.) which had maintained a stable two party system for over
fifty years, with regular turnovers in officers through contested elections.' Their purpose was to explain why this union, unlike other unions, seemed not bound by Michels' Iron Law and "to illuminate the
processes that help maintain democracy in the great society by studying
the processes of democracy in the small society of the I.T.U." 7
The conclusions reached by the three authors in their book, Union
Democracy, were as pessimistic as Michels'. The political system of the
I.T.U. was a product of factors unique to the printing trades-the special sense of occupational community, the structure of the industry, and
a fortuitous sequence of historical events. It was largely a product of
chance, "likened to a series of successive outcomes of casting dice."' The
authors concluded that the study of the I.T.U. "suggest[s] that the functional requirements for democracy cannot be met most of the time in
most labor unions or other voluntary groups." 9
Our analysis of the factors related to democracy in the I.T.U.
has pointed to conditions under which democracy may be institutionalized in large scale private governments. Basically,
however, it does not offer many positive action suggestions for
those who would seek consciously to manipulate the structure
of such organizations so as to make the institutionalization of
democratic procedures within them more probable1 °
Three years after this study was published, Congress passed the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.'' The central premise of the statute was
that unions should be democratic and that the law should prescribe
minimum standards of democratic process in the conduct of internal
union affairs. Senator McClellan proclaimed, when introducing the Bill
of Rights of Union Members, "I deem it appropriate that we insure by
law internal democracy in unions and provide for proper protection of
union members and their rights ....
""
The pessimism of Michels and the authors of Union Democracy
might seem to make Landrum-Griffin an act of futility and any concern
with its effectiveness the pursuit of a mirage. Oligarchy is inevitable; it
6. S. LIPsET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY; THE INTERNAL POLITICS

(1956).
Id. at ix.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404-05.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 29
§§ 401-531 (1976).
105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959).

OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
U.S.C.
12.
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is "the outcome of organic necessity" in large scale organizations. We
can not by statute repeal the "Iron Law of Oligarchy.""3
If our goal is ideal democracy, and we will accept nothing less, then
we, indeed, must be pessimistic. Elected union leaders will continue to
dominate the political structure and seek to create a monolithic bureaucracy which eliminates or immobilizes organized opposition in the name
of efficiency and loyalty. The law cannot and does not mandate a twoparty system, and there is no reason to hope that such a system will
emerge. Unions will continue to be one-party states.
This inevitability presents our provocative problem. How do we
provide for democracy in a one-party state? More specifically, what legal rules will protect and promote democratic processes in a union's oneparty political structure? This is a problem with which we are little
prepared to come to grips, for we have commonly equated democracy
with a multi-party system.
Although freedom is more likely to flourish with multiple parties,
the measure of democracy is not the number of parties but the degree of
recognition of individual rights by the union and its responsiveness to its
members. These values, no doubt, can be achieved in fuller measure
and with less legal intervention in multi-party systems, but it is fruitless
to hope that unions, with or without legal intervention, will establish
such systems. We must proceed, therefore, on the premise that unions
are, and will continue to be, one-party states. The real world question is
how the law can achieve increased responsiveness to the members'
desires within the union's one-party political system?
Asking the question obviously assumes that there are affirmative
answers, that the law can be shaped to make the union's one-party system more responsive. The thesis here goes further. It asserts that Congress, in writing Landrum-Griffin, perhaps more intuitively than
consciously, included provisions which loosened the grip of oligarchic
control, and that the courts have implicitly or explicitly recognized that
the statute must be interpreted so as to protect democratic rights within
a one-party system. Beyond this, the thesis presented here is that if we
see more clearly the sources and instruments of oligarchic control, we
can identify those points at which legal intervention will enable union
13. For analysis of union political process using variations on Michels' theme, see generally A. CAREW, DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNMENT IN EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS (1976); A.
COOK, UNION DEMOCRACY: PRACTICE AND IDEAL; AN ANALYSIS OF FOUR LARGE LOCAL
UNIONS (1963); M. DICKENSON, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS (1982); J.

EDELSTEIN & M.
WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY: ORGANIZATION AND OPPOSITION IN BRITISH
AND AMERICAN UNIONS (1975). For more optimistic views as to the possibilities of escaping
oligarchy, see generally J. BANKS, TRADE UNIONISM (1974); R. WILLEY, DEMOCRACY IN
WEST GERMAN TRADE UNIONS (1971).
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members to assert their rights effectively. We can then design legal rules
which will reduce the domination of unions by incumbent officers, and
make union policies and administration more responsive to the members' will.
The purpose of this article is not to make an exhaustive analysis of
the statute or the cases, but only to suggest the importance and potential
of this perspective in reading the statute and applying it to specific cases.
SOURCES AND INSTRUMENTS OF OLIGARCHY

Michels, in explaining why organizations constructed on a democratic model became undemocratic in their internal operation, identified a number of factors that led to domination by the leaders and
enabled them to maintain control. Similarly, Lipset, Trow and Coleman, in explaining why the I.T.U. had not succumbed to oligarchic
control, identified a number of ways in which the I.T.U. differed from
other unions and further illuminated the sources and instruments of
one-party control in unions. Four basic sources, emphasized in both
studies, are of special relevance here.
First, opposition to union policies and union leaders is viewed as
disloyalty. As Michels pointed out, the leaders and the supporting bureaucracy identify themselves with the organization, treating all criticism of the officers or their policies as an attack on the organization
itself, undermining it in the face of its enemies. 4 This attitude is not
limited to those with a lust for power. The greatest intolerance to criticism often comes from a profound and sincere conviction by the leadership that it is serving the best interests of the membership and that the
great majority of members approve. 15
The attitude that opposition constitutes disloyalty is often expressed in union constitutional 'provisions that subject members to discipline for "disloyalty," "undermining the union," "slandering union
officers," organizing "factions" or "caucuses," or "discussing union business outside of union meetings." This attitude is commonly shared by
many union members who are inculcated with narrow notions of loyalty
and are untroubled by leadership control. The fact that the leaders are
elected does not reduce, but reinforces, this attitude, for in the words of
Michels:
14. In Chapter III, entitled "Identification of the Party With The Leader ("Le Parti C'est
Moi"), Michels states: "The bureaucrat identifies himself completely with the organization,
confounding his own interests with its interests." R. MICHELS, supra note 1, at 228.
15. "The despotism of the leaders does not arise solely from a vulgar lust of power or from
an uncontrolled egoism, but is often the outcome of a profound and sincere conviction of their
own values and the services which they have rendered to the common cause." Id. at 229.
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Once elected, the chosen of the people can no longer be opposed in this way. He personifies the majority and all resistance to his will is anti-democratic .

.

.

. It is reasonable and

necessary that the adversaries of the government should be ex16
terminated in the name of popular sovereignty ....
Lipset, Trow, and Coleman emphasized that in the I.T.U., in contrast to other unions, organized internal opposition to the incumbent
leadership was accepted as legitimate. The loyalty of the opposition was
not questioned; opposition was accepted as right and proper, and opposition groups were to be lived with rather than destroyed.' This attitude inhibits acts of political hostility, permits open competition for
control, and prevents the development of an entrenched bureaucracy.
Legitimacy of opposition is fundamental to the stable democratic structure of the union.
The second source and instrument of oligarchy is control of the
union's bureaucracy and its resources.' The leaders customarily are
elected as a single slate, forming an unified administration sharing
power in a compact of mutual promotion and self-preservation. Together, they control the patronage of highly prized positions of paid central administration bureaucrats--education, research, and political
directors, editor of the union journal, and various division heads and
field representatives, along with their supporting staffs. In addition, the
administration can bestow a large number of prestigious, if unpaid,
committee positions and special assignments. More important, the leaders can groom their successors and eliminate potential opposition
through these appointments. Unquestioning loyalty and active support
of the incumbent administration become the prime prerequisites of original appointment, permanence of position, and future advancement.' 9
The power of appointment is supplemented by substantial control of
union funds for creating new positions, determining salary levels, approving expense allowances, and allocating money to various activities.
The union leadership and bureaucracy becomes, in Michels' terms,
a cartel or political machine, interdependent and intersupporting, devoted to perpetuating itself in power. This cartel is the political party of
the one-party state.
The third source and instrument of oligarchic control is domination
of the channels of communication. 20 Control over the union journal,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 218.
S. UPSET, supra note 6, at 249.
Id. at 9, 147-48, 182.
Id. at 230-33.
Id. at 9, 160-61, 266-68.
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with its adulation of incumbent officers, unqualified support of their
policies, and exclusion of effective presentation of other positions, is only
the most obvious instrument. Educational conferences and training
classes promote the administration's views with no provision for dissent.
The incumbent officers, their appointees, and paid staff representatives
have daily opportunities to carry the message to the members, whether
that message is promoting the administration and its policies or denigrating any opposition. The administration not only has the names and
addresses of all the members, but knows the leaders of subordinate units
and how to reach them. Through its contacts, it can identify its supporters and potential opponents, mobilize the former and isolate the
latter.
In contrast, opponents of the administration have no established
channels of communication nor access to union funds to pay for newspapers, mailings, or leaflets. They may be denied access to membership
lists and may even be unable to identify and to contact others who share
their views so as to form an organized opposition.
Fourth, oligarchic control leads to. and is reinforced by centralization of control. The incumbent officers seek to enlarge their functions,
often in the name of increasing efficiency and strengthening the union to
enable it to deal more effectively and rationally with employers. The
effect is to increase the bureaucracy, which feeds on its own hunger.
The larger the bureaucracy grows, the greater is its urge for self-preservation and its ability to fulfill that urge. Centralization is at the expense
of subordinate units which lose their autonomy of finance and function.
Leaders of subordinate units lose their independent power bases and
their ability to challenge the central administration. The bureaucratic
structure becomes monolithic, leaving little room for multiple centers of
independent political power.
Both Michels and Lipset pointed out that the Iron Law is most
strongly manifested in large complex organizations, such as national unions, districts, and multi-unit local unions.2 1 Democracy often survives,
and with continued vitality, in small units or even substantial singleplant locals. Where there is little or no bureaucracy, with few positions
of patronage, and where there is a practical ability to communicate with
other members, organized opposition occurs more regularly. By its frequency, opposition obtains a measure of legitimacy.
The four principle sources and instruments of oligarchy sketched
above, which are common to large complex organizations, understate
the control that those in power may be able to exercise over union mem21. R. MICHELS, supra note 1, at 32-35; S. LIPSET, supra note 6, at 14-15, 413.
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bers who criticize incumbents or organize opposition. The most effective instrument in a union is control over the members'jobs. Grievances
may be ignored, feebly pursued, or deliberately lost in arbitration. Joint
councils, such as those in the Teamsters, become thinly cloaked instruments of control, and hiring halls can be used to reward the ruling oligarchy's friends and punish its enemies. These devices are available and
most often effective at the local level, even in small locals, but they also
may be used at the district or national level to control rebellious local
groups.
This brief sketch of sources and instruments of oligarchy underlines
what should be self-evident-different measures are required to achieve
recognition of individual rights and responsiveness to members in a oneparty system than in a two-party system. A Bill of Rights for Union
Members must serve purposes beyond those of the United States Constitution and provide greater, or at least different, protection of individual
rights from that of the first and fourteenth amendments. Union elections cannot be analogized to governmental elections; not only their basic character, but also their function and the significance of the vote are
quite different. Most important, the law cannot be paralyzed by nominal neutrality between the incumbents in control and the opponents
who challenge their control. The function of the law must be to loosen
the grip of oligarchy so that those opposed to the incumbents can make
their voices heard and the weight of their opposition felt. The law's
dominant concern must be protecting the rights of the opposition and
reducing the advantages of the incumbents in the political contest. The
incumbents seldom need the aid of the courts; they are more than able
to help themselves.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM

Title I of Landrum-Griffin is captioned "Bill of Rights of Members
of Labor Organizations." 2 By this choice of words, the statute declares
that individual union members have basic rights within the unionrights which the law protects against encroachments by those in power.
The second, and the most important right-"Freedom of Speech and
Assembly"- declares:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right
to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at
meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates
22. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 43:93

in an election of the labor organization or upon any business
properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of
23
meetings ....
The bare statement of these rights asserts, in most fundamental terms,
the legitimacy of opposition; it is not the oligarchy but those who oppose
the oligarchy who need and are entitled to legal protection. The law
affirmatively protects the right to criticize union officers, to question
union policies, to speak against administration candidates and proposals
at union meetings, and to meet with other members and to organize
opposition to those in control. This provision thereby repudiates one of
the main sources of oligarchy and provides a base for the elementary
prerequisite for union democracy.
This guarantee reaches beyond mere affirmance of the legitimacy
of opposition, it reaches to counteract specific sources of oligarchic control. In Farowitz v. Associated Musicians of Greater New York, 2 4 the union
expelled a member for distributing leaflets urging other members not to
pay a union assessment that he claimed was illegal. The union argued
that his expulsion did not violate the Freedom of Speech and Assembly
clause because of the proviso to that clause which states:
Provided that nothing herein shall be construed to impair the
right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable
rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct
that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.2 5
The union trial board found that by continuing to urge nonpayment
after the Executive Board had assured members the assessment was legal, the member had "sought to undermine the very existence of the
Local." 26 The court of appeals, however, held that distribution of the
leaflets was protected because the statute was intended "to prevent
union officials from using their disciplinary powers to silence criticism
and punish those who dare to question and complain." 2 7
[A] member having such good reasons as here to believe that
the collection of taxes or dues runs afoul of the law has the
right to call this to the attention of the membership and to
urge that they refrain from paying such assessments.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2).
330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964).
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).
330 F.2d at 1001 (quoting the Union Trial Board's decision).
Id. at 1002 (citing Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 449 (1963)).
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A member's responsibility to his union as an institution surely can not include any obligation to sit idly by while
the union follows a course of conduct which he reasonably believes to be illegal because of what a court of law has stated. 28
Protecting freedom of speech here loosens the grip of oligarchy in
several respects. Those in control are prevented from obtaining a complete monopoly over the channels of communication by closing off the
few channels available to the members, and members are able to question openly their officers' conduct of union affairs. More important,
those who are dissatisfied can identify others who are also dissatisfied,
can reinforce and encourage one another, and can take the first step
toward coalescing an organized opposition. To serve these purposes, the
right of individuals to speak out and to distribute literature must have
much wider scope in a one-party system than in a two-party system,
which provides competing channels of communication and a known resort for those of shared views.
The court in Farowitz not only affirmed the legitimacy of opposition
but upheld the right to urge civil disobedience. Implicitly, the court
recognized that the political processes of the union were controlled by
the officers whose actions were being questioned, and that in such a oneparty system, free speech must be given broader scope, even to urging
disobedience, if those in control are to be made responsive.
Title I, in protecting the right to meet and assemble, both implements freedom of speech and shields the organizing of opposition. In
Kuebler v. ClevelandLithographers,29 a group of union members dissatisfied
with negotiations during a strike met to discuss how to get the strike
settled. A committee was named to communicate their views to the
union negotiating committee. After the strike was settled, the leader of
the group was suspended and fined for attending a meeting "held for
the purpose of undermining the Union Negotiating Committee."" The
court set aside his conviction and enjoined the union from taking any
steps to punish or retaliate against him.
To permit a union to punish its members for meeting and discussing affairs of the union would be to deny the very purpose
of the Bill of Rights provisions of the Act. It was concern for
greater democracy within unions which originally prompted
Congress to enact these provisions. . . .No democracy can

28. Id. at 1002.

29. 473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 361 (quoting the charge of the Executive Board).
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flourish where freedom of speech and assembly are hindered
by threat of reprisal . . .31
The court protected the right of members to organize so as to give
added weight to their expression of dissatisfaction even though this
might weaken the union's resolve to continue a strike. Although the
group was single purpose and transitory, its ability to take concerted
action and to focus protest made its voice heard. Where cooperation
and support of members is needed, as in a strike, the leaders may feel
compelled to listen to such groups. If there are other submerged dissatisfactions, the single purpose group may not be transitory, for by forming an organized group it will attract those with other dissatisfactions,
and the group may grow into a more broadly based opposition with
which those in power must come to terms.
These statutory rights of freedom of speech and assembly may be
likened to basic constitutional rights, but their legal protection must
take into account that they are exercised within a one-party system. In
Sa/zhandler v. Caputo,32 a leader of an opposition group accused an incumbent officer of stealing union funds. He was charged with libeling a
union officer, tried by a Trial Board consisting of other union officers,
and barred from participating in union affairs for five years. The court
voided the discipline, declaring:
So far as union discipline is concerned Salzhandler had a right
to speak his mind and spread his opinions regarding the
union's officers,
regardless of whether his statements were true
33
or false.
The court rejected the argument that there was a "public interest in
promoting the monolithic character of unions in their dealings with employers" and found that "[t]he Congress has decided that it is in the
public interest that unions be democratically governed and toward that
'34
end that discussions should be free and untrammeled.
This policy of free expression, however, does not explain why defamation should go unpunished. The reason, as the court makes clear, is
that the incumbent officers were an oligarchy and would protect each
other from attacks by opposition groups. Because the judicial process
was controlled by the oligarchy, it could not be trusted to adjudicate
charges that one member of the oligarchy had been defamed:
Freedom of expression would be stifled if those in power could
claim that any charges against them were libelous and then
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 364.
316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert den'ed, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
Id. at 451.
Id.
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proceed to discipline those responsible on a finding that the
charges were false ....
• . . It follows that although libelous statements may be
made the basis of civil suit between those concerned, the union
may not subject a member to any disciplinary action on a finding by its governing board that such statements are libelous. 3 5
Thus, constitutionally unprotected speech is statutorily protected within
the one-party system.
The special protection given to free speech in a one-party system is
further illustrated by the courts' willingness to review the union's findings of fact in discipline cases. In InternationalBrotherhoodofBoilermakers v.
Hardeman,36 a member was expelled for physically assaulting a union
business agent. The Supreme Court, in upholding the discipline, stated
that the union's findings of guilt needed to be supported by only "some
evidence" at the disciplinary hearing."' But, in Vars v. InternationalBrotherhood of Boilermakers,38 a union local president who had published statements critical of the international officers was charged with various
offenses, including submitting false pay and expense claims. He was
tried before a union hearing examiner and expelled. Although there
was some evidence to support the charges of misuse of funds, the court
reviewed the record and found the charges unsupported:
If Section 101(5) [sic] is to provide any measure of protection
for the individual union member who finds himself beseiged
by the full power of the International Union, some review is
necessary to protect such members from abuses. This is especially true in cases such as this where the hearing examiner is
not an independent figure divorced from union controversies,
but is an officer of the International Union.3 9
The court recognized that the underlying dispute was political and that
Vars was confronting the union's oligarchy. Vars, like Salzhandler,
needed special protection, both substantively and procedurally, to
counteract characteristics of the one-party state.
Judicial application of the equal rights clause, of title I in referendum cases has demonstrated a subtle understanding of what may be
required to protect the democratic processes within union political
structures. In Young o. Hayes,' the officers of the Machinists union sub-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
401 U.S. 233 (1971).
Id. at 245-46.
320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 578. The court's citation should be to 29 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5).
195 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1961).
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mitted 106 proposed changes in the union constitution to referendum
vote. Forty-seven were described as "changes made mandatory through
passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act"'" and were to be voted as a unit.
The court found that some of these were not mandatory, including ones
which increased the power of the international and restricted the power
of the local lodges and the rank and file. The court held that this grouping of amendments violated the "equal right. . . to vote. . . in referendums" guaranteed by the statute.4 2 Although all members were treated
equally, the court recognized that the officers' control over the form of
the ballot gave them dominating influence over the outcome. In Orwellian terms, some members-the officers-were more equal than others.
In the words of the court:
[Tihe right to vote extended in the Act is not a mere naked
right to cast a ballot. Rather, the general tenor of the Act
would seem to indicate that those who make up the management of the union may not submit amendments for referendum to the membership in any form they wish. Permitting a
union to submit propositions to its membership in any form
they wish might very well open up the way of usurpation of
power by union management .... 43
Other courts have held that the "equal right to vote" was denied,
despite universal sufferage, when union officials seeking approval of affiliation with another union gave incomplete or misleading information
as to the terms of the affiliation4 4 and when officers who were submitting a proposed contract for ratification failed to tell members of
changes in the seniority provisions.4 5 The courts have also required the
union to open the channels of communication by making available to
those opposing the administration's proposal the membership list for the
purpose of mailing their views to the union members.4 6
The "equal right to vote" has thus been applied by the courts, and
properly so, to curb the administration's advantage inherent in a oneparty system, and to increase the ability of those outside the oligarchy

41. Id. at 913.
42. Id. at 917.
43. Id. at 916.
44. Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ohio 1975), modifwed, 532 F.2d 1074
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976).
45. Christopher v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 644 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Sheldon v. O'Callaghan, 497 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1090 (1974).
The court declined to decide whether the dissenting local was entitled to direct access to the
list. Instead, the court required the union to turn over the membership list to a mailing
service that was chosen by the union so that the dissenting members could communicate with
the rank-and-file. Id. at 1282-83.
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and opposing it to make their votes count. 47 Full equality between the
administration and the opposition may not be achieved; but the iron
grip of oligarchy is loosened, and the democratic process is strengthened.
ELECTIONS IN A ONE-PARTY STATE

Freedom of speech and assembly are essential instruments for the
formation and development of an organized opposition that can make
union elections meaningful. Criticism of incumbent officers or current
policies by a solitary member or small groups serves as a flag around
which others who are discontented or persuaded may rally. Dissatisfied
members are no longer isolated but can identify others with whom they
may join. As the group grows it gains resources and can speak and organize more effectively to reach even more members. If the incumbent
officers are corrupt, ineffective, or unresponsive to the members, so that
dissatisfaction is widespread, the group may grow until its opposition
takes the form of challenging the incumbents in an election.
One might say that such a union has a two-party system, but this
would portray the wrong picture. The opposition group has no stable
organizational structure, no officers or staff, no patronage, no established channels of communications, and little resources. At best, it is a
loose coalition coalescing discontent. In contrast, the incumbents control the organizational structure of the union, dominate its bureaucracy,
control the channels of communication, have an apparatus of appointed
officials, business agents, field representatives and staff, and have established alliances with elected officers at other levels of the union. The
administration party consists of the union's incumbent officers and its
bureaucratic hierarchy. 48 In practical terms, the union is the party. It is
more than symbolic that the opposition will assume a title such as the
"Rank and File," "Dues Protest Movement," or "Miners for Democracy," while the incumbents need no name other than that of the union.
The enormous advantages of the incumbents obviously discourage
potential challengers, and many union elections, particularly at the national level and in districts and large multi-unit locals, go uncontested.
In contested elections the challengers seldom have a realistic chance of
winning, and the number of victories is small. Union elections, in fact,
47. See, e.g., Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 989
(1968); Bunz v. MPMO Protective Union, Local 224, 567 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers, 343 F. Supp. 236 (D. Neb. 1972), a 'd, 477 F.2d 825
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973).
48. For a description of the disadvantages under which opposition candidates work, see
generally James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA." Autocraty and Insurgency in National Union
Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247 (1978).
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rarely result in a change of union leadership. What purpose, then, do
union elections serve in providing democracy in unions?
First, although challengers seldom win, they do not always lose. Incumbents are, from time to time, unseated. Each time an incumbent is
unseated officers of other unions are reminded that they are not invulnerable; the improbable can and does happen. This makes them sensitive to criticism, and if they are prevented from silencing their critics,
they may feel the need to mend their ways lest expressed discontent coalesce into a dislodging opposition. Even an occasional unseating keeps
other officers aware that they can not afford to be indifferent to the
needs and desires of their members; responsiveness is encouraged by the
desire for self-preservation.
Second, most union leaders are motivated to be responsive to the
members less out of fear that they will be unseated than by an inner
desire to serve their members. They genuinely believe, or persuade
themselves, that they are doing what is best for their members and that
the members appreciate it. Even when they misuse their positions they
believe that it is for the good of the members, or at least that the members would approve. They want to be loved and believe that they are
loved. This belief is encouraged by the sycophantic bureaucracy and
the lack of organized opposition, which gives a false aura of universal
content-except for "a few screwball malcontents."
When an election is contested, the election campaign provides the
occasion for extensive debate of the officers' stewardship. Their personal
conduct is evaluated, their administrative abilities and integrity are examined, and their policies are debated. Submerged discontents surface
and are articulated. The incumbents are pressed to explain their conduct and to justify their policies. The election campaign is the period
when the democratic process of debate has greatest vitality, even though
in that debate the incumbents have all of the advantages.
At the end of the campaign, when the votes are counted, the tabulation does more than decide the winner. Although the incumbent wins,
the tabulation measures the level of discontent among the members. If
one third of the members vote for the insurgents in spite of the advantages favoring the incumbents, this signals a level of dissatisfaction far
beyond what the officers believed to exist or want to continue. Practices
and policies may be modified to meet the criticism and lower the level of
discontent. Although the incumbent oligarchy stays in power, it becomes responsive to the election returns. The greater the opposition
vote, the greater the responsiveness.
Third, the measure of discontent may have a more important
delayed reaction. The oligarchy is not always a flawless monolith; fre-
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quently, those in the second or lower ranks of the hierarchy are ambitious and not content to wait for promotion from within. If they saw a
chance of success, they would be willing to challenge the top officers.
When an opposition, led by a person without personal standing or a
substantial political base, obtains a one-third vote, some of those within
the oligarchy may see a brighter future as leaders of the opposition. In a
subsequent election they may become the challengers, rather than the
supporters of the incumbents. The monolith is thereby fractured. Because those who were part of the heirarchy have political skills, political
allies, and perhaps name identification, they may have a good chance of
unseating the incumbents. Significantly, in most cases when an incumbent is ousted, the challenger is one of the oligarchy and is supported by
others within the oligarchy. It is the realization by the top officers that
they have around them some who would take advantage of discontent to
displace them that increases their sensitivity to the needs and desires of
the members.
The central point is that the usefulness of union elections is not
measured solely by the frequency with which the incumbents are unseated, although the more often this happens the more responsive union
officers will be. The usefulness of elections lies rather in the frequency
with which they are contested and the fullness and accuracy with which
they measure the level of discontent. Their usefulness is increased by
enabling or encouraging those who can make the best showing to be
opposition candidates. This leads to the question of what does the law,
or what can the law, do to increase the usefulness of union elections in
these terms?
Title IV of Landrum-Griffin, in regulating union elections, strikes
at one of the basic roots of oligarchy. 49 By requiring unions to hold
periodic elections it declares in unequivocal terms the legitimacy of opposition. More than that it presupposes organized opposition and provides that opposition an opportunity to articulate dissatisfactions, to
debate union policies, and possibly to displace the incumbent oligarchs.
The statute expressly guarantees every member the right to be a candidate, subject to "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed," and the
right to support the candidate "of his choice, without being subject to
penalty, discipline, or improper interference or reprisal." 5
Beyond legitimating opposition, the statute includes specific provisions designed to curb some of the advantages of the incumbents in the

49. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959 § 40103, 29 U.S.C. § 481-83 (1975).
50. Id. at § 481 (e).
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election. Title IV opens channels of communication by obligating the
incumbent officers "to comply with all reasonable requests of any candidate to distribute by mail or otherwise at the candidate's expense campaign literature in aid of such person's candidacy to all members in
good standing." Equal access is provided by further requiring the incumbents "to refrain from discrimination in favor of or against any candidate with respect to the use of lists of members and . . . distribution
• . . of campaign literature" at union expense. 5 '
The advantages of the incumbents are further curbed by section
401 (g),52 which prohibits the use of any union funds to support or promote any candidate. This bars the use of any union resources on behalf
of an incumbent. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held that the use of a
union's mimeograph machine to print campaign leaflets violates this
section and requires that the election be invalidated.5 3 The Secretary of
Labor has declared in an interpretive bulletin:
[O]fficers and employees may not campaign on time that is
paid for by the union, nor use union funds, facilities, equipment, stationery, etc., to assist them in such campaigning.5 4
The reach of provisions to limit the advantages of the incumbents
was illustrated when Yablonski, a member of the Executive Board of the
Mine Workers, challenged the incumbent president, Boyle. As soon as
Yablonski announced his intention to run, Boyle and his supporters on
the Executive Board removed Yablonski from his position as head of the
lobbying department. The court enjoined his removal as an act of reprisal. 5 When Yablonski requested that campaign literature be mailed
out, the secretary-treasurer refused on the grounds that he was not a
candidate because he had not yet been nominated by the required
number of local unions. The court ordered the mailing, saying that he
was a candidate within the meaning of the statute when he declared his
intention to run and that he needed to send out campaign literature to
win nominations by local unions.56 During a three month period, the
union journal had 166 references to and 16 pictures of Boyle, reporting
favorably on his activities on behalf of the members, but made no men51. Id. at § 481(c).
52. Id. at § 4 8 1(g).
53. Shultz v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 426 F.2d 969, 972-73 (1970), affd sub. nom.
Hodgson v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971). See also Brennan v. Local
300, Laborer's Int'l Union, 85 L.R.R.M. 2648 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Brennan v. Sindicato Empleados, 370 F. Supp. 872 (D.P.R. 1974); Usery v. Stoveworkers Int'l Union, 547 F.2d 1043
(8th Cir. 1977).
54. Office of Labor-Management Standards Enforcement, 29 C.F.R. § 452.76 (1983).
55. Yablonski v. UMW, 71 L.R.R.M. 3041 (D.D.C. 1969).
56. Yablonski v. UMW, 71 L.R.R.M. 2606 (D.D.C. 1969).
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tion of Yablonski's efforts to obtain favorable legislation. The court held
that this use of the journal constituted discriminatory use of the membership list, enjoined further discrimination, and ordered the union to
distribute to all members a copy of the court's findings and order.57
During the campaign period Boyle gave staff employees a retroactive
pay increase and then demanded contributions from them for his campaign fund. After Boyle won the election, the Secretary of Labor
brought suit to set it aside. Two of the principal grounds were the use of
the union journal and the contributions by paid staff employees. These
constituted use of union funds to promote Boyle's candidacy.5"
This is not to suggest that the statute removes all advantages of the
incumbents; the statute, at most, reduces that advantage, and it reduces
the advantage less than it might. For example, a candidate has no right
to a list of the names and addresses of members but is entitled only to
inspect such a list once within 30 days prior to the election. 59 A challenger may thereby be unable to make personal contact with members,
particularly when they are widely scattered. The incumbents in fact
have access to the list; during their period of office they have opportunities for widespread contact; and the paid staff have regular personal contact, both before and during the campaign.
The courts have gone beyond the bare words of the statute in recognizing that if the statute is to serve its purpose the words should be interpreted to provide the special safeguards needed to counteract the
union's oligarchic control. In WMrtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees,' the
union required that to be eligible for major elective offices, a candidate
must have held an elective office or been a member of the Assembly, a
representative body. The justification for this rule was that the union
had 27,000 members and controlled assets of over $32 million. It was
important to have top officers who were experienced and have demonstrated their ability. The Supreme Court was not persuaded and held
that this qualification was not reasonable. The Court pointed out that in
practice to get elected to the Assembly a member had to run on the
administration slate. In addition, vacancies to offices and Assembly
seats were filled by appointment by the Executive Board.
'This enables the incumbent group to qualify members for
elective office by a procedure not available to dissidents.'
Control by incumbents through devices which operate in
57.
58.
59.
60.

Yablonski v. UMW, 305 F. Supp. 868, 875-76 (D.D.C. 1969).
Hodgson v. UMW, 344 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1972).
29 U.S.C. § 481(c).
391 U.S. 492 (1968).
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the manner of this by-law is precisely what Congress legislated
against in the LMRDA.6 1
Similarly, in Donovan v. Laborers Local 120,62 the court invalidated a
union procedure for disqualifying candidates who were not "competent
to perform the duties of the office." Competency was to be determined
by three Election Judges appointed by the Local Executive Board. The
potential of control and distortion of the election process were obvious
to the court, which stated:
When so much discretion is placed in the hands of those chosen by the incumbents, the possibilities of abuse are clear, and
free and democratic elections are threatened.6 3
The Supreme Court has recognized and given determinative
weight to much less obvious problems confronting oppostion groups in a
one-party system. In Local 3489, Steelworkers v. Usey ,64 the union required that a candidate, to be eligible, must have attended at least one
half of the local union meetings in the last three years. The union justified this requirement on the grounds that it encouraged attendance at
meetings and assured that those elected had demonstrated a sustained
interest and familiarity with union affairs. Again, the Court was not
persuaded. The rule had the effect of disqualifying 96.5% of the members and was not consistent with the goal of free and democratic elections. To the union's argument that any member who wanted to run for
office could qualify by attending eighteen meetings over a three year
period, the Court responded in terms recognizing the transitory nature
of opposition groups in a one-party state:
In the absence of a permanent "opposition party" within the
union, opposition to the incumbent leadership is likely to
emerge in response to particular issues at different times, and
member interest in changing union leadership is therefore
likely to be at its highest only shortly before elections. Thus it
is probable that to require a member to decide upon a potential candidacy at least 18 months in advance of an election
when no issues exist to prompt that decision may not foster but
discourage candidacies and to that extent impair the general
membership's freedom to oust incumbents in favor of new
leadership.6 5

61. Id. at 504-05 (quoting the district court's opinion 265 F. Supp. 510, 520) (citations
omitted).
62. 683 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1982).
63. Id. at 1104.
64. 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
65. Id. at 310-11.
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And in Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers,6 6 the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized the advantages which incumbents gain by holding
office. The Secretary of Labor brought suit to set aside an election because candidates had been disqualified by a meeting attendance rule.
While the case was on appeal in the court of appeals, the union held its
next regular election, and the court of appeals thereupon mooted the
case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the intervention of a
subsequent unsupervised election could not wash away the unlawfulness
infecting a challenged election because those who won in the tainted
election would, by reason of holding the office, have an advantage in the
subsequent election. It was, said the Court,
Congress's evident conclusion that only a supervised election
could offer assurance that the officers who achieved office as
beneficiaries of violations of the Act would not by some means
perpetuate their unlawful control in the succeeding election.
That conclusion was reached in light of the abuses surfaced by
the extensive congressional inquiry showing how incumbents'
use of their inherent advantages over potential rank and file
challengers established and perpetuated dynastic control of
some unions ....
• . .Congress, when it settled on the remedy of a supervised election, considered the risk of incumbents' influence to
be substantial, not a mere suspicion. 7
Lower courts have recognized other special problems of those challenging incumbents in union elections. An insurgent candidate in a
large local requested the names and addresses of the 125 employers with
whom the union had contracts so he could distribute literature at each
location. When the union refused, the court read section 104' expansively, holding that his right to inspect collective agreements under section 104 was intended to give "the rank and file access to information
about union affairs." 69 Section 104, which ostensibly gave the member
a right to know the content of his collective agreement, was used by the
court to open up channels of communication for an opposition
candidate.
In another case, a local union changed the election from a meeting
to a mail vote and five days later sent out ballots urging members to
vote immediately. The court invalidated the election, noting that the

66. 389 U.S. 463 (1968).
67. Id. at 474.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1975).
69. Colpo v. General Teamsters Union Local Union 326, 512 F. Supp. 1093, 1095 (D.
Del. 1981).
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change severely hampered the challengers because their views were relatively unknown to the members, while the incumbents' policies were
well known.7" Nominally equal access to the members was not enough.
The opposition must be guaranteed an opportunity to get campaign
literature into the hands of members before they vote in order to offset
the advantage of the incumbents.
In a bizarre case, a district and circuit court demonstrated an understanding of the underlying problem, as contrasted with the Department of Labor's woodenness. Incumbent officers who lost an election
challenged it on the grounds that secrecy of the ballot had not been
preserved and that ballots had been destroyed-the incumbents, knowing that they were going to lose, had committed the violations themselves. The Secretary of Labor brought suit to set aside the election,
reasoning that there were admitted violations which "may have affected
the outcome" and that section 4027' required him to bring suit.7 2 The
court looked beyond the bare words of the statute and dismissed the
suit. The vice which the statute was to correct, said the court, was the
use by union officers of the "power of their offices to emasculate challenges to their leadership by the rank and file, and thereby perpetuate
dynastic control."7 3 The statute should be read and applied to correct
the vice of dynastic control, not to perpetuate it.
In a less explicit way, the Supreme Court has served the special
purpose of union elections for measuring the level of discontent. In Local
6," the Court held that the unreasonable eligibility rules "may have
effected the outcome of the election" although the opposition had pulled
only fifteen percent of the vote, none of the disqualified nominees was a
proven vote-getter, there was no substantial election issue, and the incumbents had the overwhelming advantage of a full slate. The Court
declared, contrary to any realistic evaluation, that this did not "necessarily contradict the logical inference that some or all of the disqualified
candidates might have been elected had they been permitted to run." 75
Using this "logical inference," the Court ordered a rerun. The rerun did
not provide the opposition with any realistic opportunity of winning,
but it did provide for a more reliable reading of the level of discontent.
Following the logic of Local 6, the Secretary of Labor and the courts

70. Marshall v. Local 468, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 643 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1981).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1975).
72. Marshall v. Local 1010, United Steelworkers, 498 F. Supp. 368, 378 (N.D. Ohio
1980), aj'd, 664 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1981).
73. Id.
74. 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
75. Id. at 508.
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have taken the position that any violation which has a potentially general impact on the vote, such as use of union funds, 76 refusal to send out
literature,7 7 or interference with campaigning will invalidate the election even though no reasonable estimate of its effect would justify a conclusion that it provided the margin of victory. Only if the violation
mathematically could not have affected votes equal to the margin of
victory will the election be upheld. As a result, the practical value of
many rerun elections is to obtain a more accurate measure of discontent
and the strength of the opposition.
Explicit recognition that an important function of union elections is
to measure discontent would give the statutory words, "may have affected the outcome," a different meaning. A re-elected incumbent's response will be quite different if the opposition polls thirty-five percent of
the vote instead of twenty percent. If the violation significantly reduces
the opposition's vote, then it affects the impact or "outcome" of the election even though the opposition would have lost in any event. In such a
case, the purpose of the election can be fully served only by a rerun
which will more reliably measure the level of discontent. Neither the
Secretary of Labor nor the courts, however, has yet been willing to read
the word "outcome" in the context of an election in a one-party system,
but instead have read it in the prosaic context of a two-party election, in
which the contestants have relatively equal chances of winning.
Congress, in its design of title IV, pointed to some of the protections
needed to have democratic elections in a one-party system, and the
courts have explicitly recognized some of the devices of dynastic control.
The oligarchy, however, inevitably retains great advantages in mounting election campaigns. The union newspapers cannot be used during
the election period, but in the period between elections the incumbents
have a press monopoly. The newspaper must maintain a pretense of
neutrality during the weeks immediately before an election, but it can
be, and is, used to praise the officers and their policies in the years between elections. Paid employees cannot campaign on working time except, in the words of the Secretary of Labor, "campaigning incidental to
union business."'7' For staff representatives or business agents who are
in constant contact with members, "incidental" campaigning may be
pervasive, and because their function is to handle grievances, negotiate
agreements, and otherwise be of service to the members, their campaign-

76. Shultz v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), af'd.ub, nom.
Hodgson v. Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971); Usery v. Stove Workers,
547 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1977).
77. Wirtz v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 267 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
78. 29 C.F.R. 452.76 (1983).
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ing is particularly effective. Many of the paid staff normally work long
and irregular hours. If they do not campaign during the nine to five
forty-hour week, they will still have many working hours left in which to
campaign. There is no limitation on campaigning by those who have
been given unpaid, but much sought after, committee assignments or
other prestigious positions.
Beyond these nearly overwhelming organizational advantages, the
incumbents have equally overwhelming advantages in raising funds to
conduct the campaign. The paid staff is asked to contribute generously,
and they understand that their salary is paid with a lien for generous
amounts. Few union leaders are as clumsy as "Tony" Boyle, waiting
until the election contest arrives and then granting increases and requiring return contributions. The campaign chest is filled with annual contributions between elections and supplemented with special "gifts" at
election time.
Opposition groups have no remotely comparable organization or
source of funds. Even if the administration is fractured and the opposition is headed by one of the officers, he may have control of little or no
patronage. In most national unions, the paid staff representatives are
appointed by the president, although they may be assigned to and work
under regional directors or other officers, and the accumulated campaign chest is controlled by the president. Opposition candidates must
seek financial support largely from working members or from friends
outside the union.
A court's failure to keep in the forefront of their considerations the
inherent and overwhelming advantages of incumbents can defeat the
purpose of title IV. Three recent cases dramatically, and disastrously,
illustrate how such a failure can turn the statute upside down. In Marshall v. Teamster Local 20,' 9 an insurgent candidate in a large scattered
local union obtained loans and gifts from his family doctor, the owner of
a bar, his brother, and various friends. When the insurgent won, the
Secretary of Labor brought suit to invalidate the election on the
grounds that he had received contributions from "employers" in violation of section 401 (g).8 o Some of those who had contributed technically
fit the definition of "employer" because they had employees, although
they had no business dealings with the union. Upon the Department of
Labor's urging, the court refused to consider the realities of union elections and read the statutory words with blind literalness and with no
recognition of the problem involved.

79. 611 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1979).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 48 1(g).
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The one-party structure of the union requires that the use of union
funds be strictly prohibited, but the incumbent's great advantage in
raising funds within the union requires that contributions from other
sources not be restricted in the absence of compelling need. Employers
with whom the union bargains should, of course, be barred from contributing to a candidate; the potential for favoritism, extortion, or corruption is obvious. But barring contributions from everyone who has a
nurse, secretary, or housemaid as an employee cuts off the principal,
though meager, source of funds available to a challenger and serves only
to increase the relative advantage of incumbents.
The Supreme Court gave the screw an extra twist in United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski.8 1 In 1977, Sadlowski mounted a substantial challenge to McBride, the administration's candidate for president of the
Steelworkers. McBride raised more than eighty-five percent of his campaign funds by contributions from union staff employees. Sadlowski,
lacking these resources, obtained substantial contributions from sympathetic individuals and organizations outside the union, none of whom
had any actual or potential bargining relations with the union. After
McBride won, the union constitution was amended, on the instigation of
the officers, to prohibit any candidate from soliciting or accepting "financial support or any other direct or indirect support of any kind (except an individual's own volunteered personal time) from any nonmember."82
The Supreme Court held that this "outsider" rule did not violate
the union member's freedom of speech and assembly but was a reasonable restriction on those rights. The Court admitted that this weakened
the ability of members "to criticize union policies and to mount effective
challenges to union leadership," but unrealistically speculated that "the
impact may not be substantial."8 3 The Court comforted itself with the
empty assertion that "the rank and file probably can provide support,
citing one instance of a challenger who was able to raise money within
the union.84 The Court, in a puzzling lapse of memory, forgot "the extensive congressional inquiry showing how incumbents' use of their inherent advantages over potential rank-and-file challengers established
and perpetuated dynastic control of some unions, '' 85 which had earlier
led it to recognize the need for special protection of the opposition.

81.
82.
83.
84.

457 U.s. 102 (1982).
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA CONST. art. V,

§ 27.

457 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 113-14.

85. Wirtz v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 474 (1968), (citing S. REP. No. 1417,
85th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1958)).
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In a one-party system, elections are seldom contested and the incumbents are even more seldom unseated. The fact that on rare occasions challengers may be able to raise enough money within the union to
mount a campaign does not disprove the need for outside sources of
funds if elections are to serve their functions of keeping officers responsive and of adequately measuring the level of discontent. To serve the
statutory purpose, election contests must be frequent and effective, and
this requires that potential challengers have at least the hope of mounting credible campaigns. In a one-party system, the opposition is inevitably discouraged by its inherent disadvantage, and without legal support
cannot provide a fully effective democratic process. The purpose of the
statute requires that challengers be encouraged, not discouraged; that
the ability to oppose be affirmatively reinforced rather than be weakened; and that the election contest be equalized instead of made more
unbalanced.
The court of appeals, in Sadlowski, 86 analogized free speech rights
under the statute to free speech under the first amendment. Following
the reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo ,87 the court held that rules preventing
candidates from amassing the resources for effective advocacy violated
the statute. The Supreme Court responded that section 101(a)(2)" a
should not "be read as incorporating the entire body of first amendment
law" and that union rules restricting free speech were valid "so long as
they are reasonable; they need not pass the stringent tests applied in the
first amendment context." 9 This reverses reality. Free speech needs
even wider scope in a one-party state than in a two-party system because
there is no free press and no established opposing party to criticize those
in power. Restrictions imposed by a one-party system must be even
more strictly scrutinized and stringently tested, for those in power are
less tolerant of criticism and less subject to political check. Curbs by a
ruling oligarchy on those who would challenge their control are entitled
to less deference than restrictions adopted by a two-party legislature.
The purpose of the statute was to loosen the iron grip of oligarchy, not
tighten its stranglehold.
The failure of the Court in Sadlowski to recognize how incumbents
use their inherent advantages to establish and perpetuate dynastic control is matched by the thinness of its opinion in Finnegan v. Leu.° When
an opposition candidate in a large Teamster local defeated the incum-

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

645 F.2d 1114, 1120-25 (1981).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).
457 U.S. at 109, 111.
456 U.S. 431 (1982).
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bent, one of his first official acts was to discharge all business agents who
had supported the incumbent. The Court held that this did not infringe
the business agents' free speech as they had alleged "only an indirect interference with their membership rights, maintaining that they were
forced to 'choos[e] between their rights of free expression . . .and their
jobs.' "91 In a more lucid moment, the Court would have recognized
that Congress, in seeking to make unions democratic, did not intend to
allow a ruling oligarchy to force such a choice on union members.
Again, with seeming absent-mindedness as to how it had interpreted the statute to counteract oligarchic control, the Court declared:
Indeed, neither the language nor the legislative history of the
Act suggests that it was intended even to address the issue of
union patronage.
. . .Nothing in the Act evinces a congressional intent to
alter the traditional pattern which would permit a union president under these circumstances to appoint agents of his choice
to carry out his policies.92
Patronage is one of the chief instruments for creating and maintaining the one-party system. It provides the incumbents rewards for supporters, creates a corps of motivated campaign workers, and provides
the principal source of campaign funds. The dangers of patronage to
the democratic process, even in a two-party system, have been recognized by the Hatch Act9 3 and Supreme Court decisions limiting the discharge of public employees because of their political affiliation or
activities. The intent of Congress was to protect and to promote the
democratic process in unions; fulfilling that intention within the union's
one-party system requires protecting union employees even more than
public employees from discrimination because of the exercise of democratic rights. By its passage of the statute, Congress evinced an intent to
alter many traditional patterns that had helped produce union oligarchy. Coerced political loyalty of paid staff is well within the range of
that congressional intent.
The common flaw in these three cases is that instead of decreasing
the advantages of incumbents in union elections, the decisions increased
the advantages. This is a perversion of Congressional intent. The declared and unquestioned purpose of Congress was to ensure fair and
democratic elections. Congress recognized that one of the major obsta-

91. Id. at 440 (emphasis is in original) (quoting Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Retail
Clerks It'l Ass'n, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (D.C. 1969)).
92. Id. at 441 (footnote omitted).

93. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1982).
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cles to meaningful elections was the inherent advantage of incumbents
and it sought to curb the advantage. The Court, in a series of cases, has
articulated this Congressional purpose and has interpreted the statute to
reach devices which perpetuated oligarchic control. The aberrant cases,
by their conspicuous blindness, underline the importance of keeping
clearly in view the special protections needed for insuring a measure of
democracy in a one-party system.
CONCLUSION

There is neither time nor need here to explore the problems and
potentials of other titles of the Act. It is enough to say that they do
serve, in one measure or another, to loosen at least a little the iron grip
of oligarchy. Section 201(c), for example, loosens the monopoly of information allowing the opposition to learn something of the conduct of
union affairs, information which will increase their ability to criticize
the performance of those in power.94 Title III, by limiting trusteeships,
helps preserve a measure of local autonomy, permitting the development of scattered centers of political strength potentially capable of
challenging the central hierarchy. 5 Title V, by imposing fiduciary duties, enables individuals and groups who are politically helpless to use
the courts to hold the ruling oligarch to a measure of responsibility.96
Successful court actions, in turn, may provide the spark and fuel for
developing an organized opposition.
My purpose here is not to elaborate on the multitude of points at
which the statute could and should be construed to meet the special
needs for providing democracy in a one-party system. My limited purpose is to illustrate by a few examples how the statute has been or could
be read to achieve that end. The basic premise, which ought not need
repeating, is that the congressional intent can be fulfilled only by explicitly recognizing that unions are one-party bureaucracies. Achieving
some measure of democratic responsiveness requires that the legal rules
encourage and specially protect opposition groups and curb the instruments of advantage and control by which incumbents frustrate opposition and forestall effective political challenges. The law can never
achieve the open democratic process which comes with a two-party system, but it can, properly focused, significantly increase the responsiveness of leaders in a one-party system.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 43 1(c). "Every labor organization required to submit a report under this
subchapter shall make available the information required to be contained in such report to all
its members ....
" Id.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 461-66.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b).

